Brocade Communications Systems NetIron CER Series Specifications Page 8

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Brocade MLXand NetIron® Family Devices with Multi-Service IronWare R05.7.00
Security Target Version 1., July 15, 2014
Page 8 of 50
NetIron (unlike the Broacde FastIron series, which provides no SSL encryption for external authentication servers)
provides SSL encrypted TACACS+ authentication but does not provide SSL encrypted RADIUS. Thus, the use of
RADIUS external authentication services are excluded from the evaluated configuration of the TOE. NetIron’s
TACACS+ supports password authentication only and does not support SSH public-ley authentication.
1.4.1.2 Logical Boundaries
This section summarizes the security functions provided by the Brocade MLXe® and NetIron® Family Devices
with Multi-Service IronWare R05.7.00: The TOE logical boundary consists of the security functionality of the
products summarized in the following subsections
Security audit
Cryptographic support
User data protection
Identification and authentication
Security management
Protection of the TSF
TOE access
Trusted path/channels
Note that use of the following features is limited in the evaluated TOE:
1. The use of SNMP has not been subject to evaluation. Note that SNMP can be used only to monitor as
SNMP cannot access any security related parameters.
2. The Strict Password Enforcement setting is assumed to be enabled in the evaluated configuration.
3. The TOE will be operated in Common Criteria mode (a more restricted mode than FIPS mode).
Given that this Security Target conforms to the NDPP, the security claims focus on the TOE as a secure network
infrastructure device and do not focus on other key functions provided by the TOE, such as controlling the flow of
network packets among the attached networks. However, those functions can be freely used without affecting the
claimed and evaluated security functions; they simply have not been evaluated to work correctly themselves.
The TOE protects itself from tampering and bypass by offering only a limited and controlled set of functions at each
of its physical interfaces to its environment. Communication via those interfaces is either directed at the TOE for the
purpose of administration or is directed through the TOE for communication among network devices. In both cases
the TOE implements a set of policies to control the services available and those services are designed to protect and
ensure the secure operation of the TOE.
The TOE includes the ability to communicate with a SYSLOG server in its environment to access its services. The
TOE is designed to interact with each of those servers in accordance with their respective protocols, including
security capabilities where applicable.
1.4.1.2.1 Security audit
The TOE is designed to be able to generate logs for a wide range of security relevant events. The TOE can be
configured to store the logs locally so they can be accessed by an administrator and also to send the logs to a
designated log server using TLS to protect the logs while in transit on the network.
1.4.1.2.2 Cryptographic support
The TOE is a FIPS-validated cryptographic module that provides key management, random bit generation,
encryption/decryption, digital signature and secure hashing and key-hashing features in support of higher level
cryptographic protocols including SSH and TLS/HTTPS.
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