Brocade Communications Systems NetIron CER Series Manual Page 16

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Version 1.1, 03/31/2015
GSS CCT Evaluation Technical Report Page 16 of 56 © 2015 Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc.
Document: AAR-BrocadeNetIron5.8 All rights reserved.
the TOE. The evaluator shall observe that these data are not able to be viewed in the clear during this transfer, and
that they are successfully received by the TOE. The evaluator shall perform this test for each protocol selected in
the second selection.
TOE is not an audit server
Testing of the trusted channel mechanism will be performed as specified in the associated assurance activities for
the particular trusted channel mechanism. The evaluator shall perform the following test for this requirement:
Test 1: The evaluator shall establish a session between the TOE and the audit server according to the configuration
guidance provided. The evaluator shall then examine the traffic that passes between the audit server and the TOE
during several activities of the evaluator’s choice designed to generate audit data to be transferred to the audit
server. The evaluator shall observe that these data are not able to be viewed in the clear during this transfer, and
that they are successfully received by the audit server. The evaluator shall record the particular software (name,
version) used on the audit server during testing.
The evaluator followed the procedures in the FIPS Guide, Appendix B for setting up the syslog server connection.
The audit server tested was CentOS release 6.4 final; openSSL 1.0.1e-fips 11 feb 2013. The evaluator used
Wireshark to observe the traffic between the TOE and the audit log server. The evaluator was able to establish a
connection with each of the claimed TLS ciphers while performing this test. The evaluator used the syslog server to
store audit as recommended by the Brocade for the duration of testing so many audit records were recorded
during the course of testing.
2.2 CRYPTOGRAPHIC SUPPORT (FCS)
2.2.1 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY GENERATION (FOR ASYMMETRIC KEYS) (FCS_CKM.1)
2.2.1.1 FCS_CKM.1.1
TSS Assurance Activities The evaluator shall ensure that the TSS contains a description of how the TSF complies
with 800-56A and/or 800-56B, depending on the selections made. This description shall indicate the sections in
800-56A and/or 800-56B that are implemented by the TSF, and the evaluator shall ensure that key establishment is
among those sections that the TSF claims to implement.
Any TOE-specific extensions, processing that is not included in the documents, or alternative implementations
allowed by the documents that may impact the security requirements the TOE is to enforce shall be described.
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